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 Sucking the Juice without Biting the Rind:
 Aristofle and Tragic Mimesis
 Sheila Murnaghan
 A RISTOLES PoEics is one of the most authoritative and influential and one of the most problem-ridden and unsatisfactory-works
 *n the history of criticism: at once our most honored guide to the
 reading of Greek tragedy and a text that itself offers many problems of
 interpretation. For centuries, theorists and critics of tragedy have
 routinely grounded their arguments in Aristotle's formulations and
 terminology. And in many respects, Aristotle is an obliging authority,
 providing a handy definition of the genre and a series of suggestive
 labels for tragedy's main elements: pathos (suffering), peripeteia (rever
 sal), anagnorisis (recognition), hamartia (error), and catharsis (purga
 tion? purification? intellectual clarification?).
 On the other hand, it is not always easy to apply the precepts of the
 Poetics to actual tragedies. Terms such as hamartia and catharsis are
 neither transparent in meaning nor equally applicable to all plays, and
 they have been most fruitful when mistranslated, as "tragic flaw," or
 "homeopathic cure." The overall theory in which those terms are found
 is obscured by silences and contradictions. More generally, the Poetics
 situates tragic action in a philosopher's universe, a secular and intelli
 gible world devoid of tragedy's most powerful features: divine incursions
 into human affairs, unsolvable conflicts, events that human beings
 cannot understand or control. Many of Aristotle's most astute critics see
 him as denaturing tragedy by rationalizing it,' and others have chosen to
 treat the views expressed in the Poetics as extensions of Aristotle's
 philosophical positions rather than as insights into tragic practice. One
 recent commentator goes so far as to divide students of the Poetics into
 two camps: "those who care about tragedy and those who care about
 Aristotle."2
 There is, in fact, a deep affinity between the argument of the Poetics
 and actual Greek tragedy, but we cannot locate that affinity by trying to
 elicit a coherent formula from the text and then applying it to every
 extant play. Rather we must understand Aristotle's theory as his own
 response to the fundamental challenge posed by the genre of tragedy,
 the challenge of presenting unacceptable experience in acceptable
 New Litemay His"t, 1995, 26: 755-773
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 form. The specific solutions Aristotle found to that challenge constitute
 not an exhaustive definition of the genre, but rather examples of how
 one might come to terms with the inherent problems of writing tragedy.
 To the extent that his solutions are contradictory, they point us to
 contradictions within the genre, and we will leam more from attending
 to Aristotle's paradoxes than from trying to argue them away. Despite his
 assured and systematic manner, Aristotle is truest to tragedy when he,
 like a character in a tragic plot, is caught in a dilemma.
 The most glaring contradiction in the Poetics-"a deep dilemma in the
 theory of tragedy"3 and the greatest obstacle in the way of eliciting a
 coherent theory from the text-is the contradiction between what is said
 in chapter 13 and what is said in chapter 14 about the best kind of tragic
 plot. In chapter 13, Aristotle goes out of his way to insist that the best
 kind of tragic plot includes an unhappy outcome: in the best plots, a
 character who is not morally bad suffers a fall into misfortune. Along
 with others whose stories fit this pattern, he mentions Oedipus, the hero
 of what often appears to be Aristotle's favorite play, the Oedipus Tyrannus
 of Sophocles; he criticizes audiences who prefer plots with happy
 outcomes; and he labels Euripides the most tragic of playwrights
 because so many of his plots end unhappily.
 But in chapter 14 Aristotle ranks the type of plot exemplified by the
 Oedipus Tyrannus as only second best, behind a type most modern
 readers cannot see as tragic. In this new version of the best plot, a
 terrible pathos of the kind proper to tragedy, an act of violence between
 people who are related to one another, does not occur. Such an event is
 on the verge of occurring, but a recognition scene intervenes to prevent
 it, and the unhappy outcome toward which the plot was moving is
 averted: "someone about to do something irremediable through igno
 rance undergoes recognition before doing it."4 This is a plot from which
 pathos is absent; it lacks what seems to be the essence of tragedy not only
 for Aristotle's puzzled exegetes, who variously invoke "romance" or
 "melodrama" as more appropriate labels, but for Aristotle himself, who
 has ended the previous chapter by relegating to the realm of comedy
 those plots in which "nobody is killed by anybody" (P 13.1453a38-39).
 A number of explanations of the preference expressed in chapter 14
 for plots in which pathos is averted by recognition rightly point out that
 such plots are not entirely devoid of pathos: if tragic actions are not
 present in actuality, they are present in prospect. Those prospective
 actions can have a comparable effect on the audience, arousing in them
 the emotional response proper to such actions while also sparing them
 the depiction of horrific and polluting events. This point is well stated by
 Gerald Else:
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 If the deed of horror to come is presented so vividly that we imagine it already
 performed, but then is cancelled before the blood has actually flowed, the
 pathetic effect is all the purer. The poet has enabled us, so to speak, to suck the
 juice without biting the rind. He has given us a pathos-in-essence, free from the
 actual goriness that would otherwise attach to it: an idea of the pathos which does
 duty for the thing itself . . . if the poet can achieve this tour de force-can
 communicate the full emotional impact of a pathos-without giving us one-he
 has achieved the ultimate so far as pathos and its related parts are concerned.5
 Else's comment shows how a preference for recognition before action
 is not a departure from Aristotle's concern with pathos, but a logical
 extension of it, although Else is surely wrong to conclude that, for
 Aristotle, such a plot is better because a violent act is even more
 powerful if it is not actually represented. Aristotle seems well attuned to,
 and very much concerned about, the emotional impact of violent acts
 that are actually represented, and this concern generates the preference
 expressed in chapter 14 for violence that is not represented.
 Else's characterization of a plot centering on unrepresented violence
 as involving the substitution of an idea for the thing itself points to the
 real attraction of this plot for Aristotle: the way in which an action that
 is strongly evoked but not actually performed replicates an essential
 feature of all mimesis, or imitation. Any mimesis is an evocation of an
 action that does not really happen, that is not really performed, that
 only gives the illusion of actually taking place. Thus any mimesis shares
 the most salient feature of Aristotle's best kind of tragic plot, the plot in
 which "the deed to come is presented so vividly that we imagine it
 already performed" and the poet gives us "an idea of the pathos which
 does duty for the thing itself." In other words, Aristotle's ideal plot
 recapitulates within the play the kind of event that the play itself
 constitutes. Not only does the play imitate an action, but the action it
 imitates dramatizes the way imitation works. The play's contents include
 an element normally confined to its form: the fact that the action
 imitated is not actually taking place.
 Accounts of mimesis vary according to whether they play up or play
 down the inevitable difference between an imitation and the object or
 action that it imitates.6 In Aristotle's version, this gap between object and
 imitation is foregrounded as a key element of mimesis. In the opening
 chapter of the Poetics, he proposes a categorization of literary genres that
 equates mimesis with fiction,7 and throughout the treatise he stresses the
 idealizing capacity of mime-sis, its ability to portray things as they ought to
 be rather than as they are (P2.1448a4-6, 16-18; 25.1460bll, 32-35).
 Aristotle's insistence on the distance between imitation and object is
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 dictated by his project of defending tragedy. For tragedy is characteristi
 cally about events that ought not to happen, actions that people should
 not take, experiences that people do not want to have. In Aristotle's own
 formulation, which is representative although not exhaustive, tragedy
 focuses on acts of violence between philoi, "close friends or relatives"
 (P 14.1453bl9-23), actions that compound the horror of death and
 physical suffering with the violation of ties that are supposed to be
 secured by their sanctity and their basis in nature. Such actions
 transgress against the rules of culture, which exist in part to protect
 people from just such experiences.
 Not only are the events imitated in tragedy themselves unwanted, but
 imitations of them often inspire distaste and suspicion. This is not just
 because they are unpleasant to witness, but because of fears about
 imitation, which is thought to have magical powers. Magic itself is often
 based on imitation-a magical spell mimics in words the fertility it
 causes or pins stuck in a wax doll represent in advance the assaults to be
 suffered by a real human victim-and this efficaciousness may be seen as
 an inevitable consequence of imitation, whether it is sought or not.
 Drama, as a form of imitation that involves performance, is particularly
 likely to be ascribed this literally performative power. It is therefore not
 surprising that civilized structures are often wary of a genre like tragedy
 that imitates dangerous and disruptive events, or that a theorist of
 tragedy like Aristotle should need to address the fear that tragedy
 replicates and perpetuates those experiences that civilization tries to
 exclude from its bounds.8
 For us, anxiety about the power of imitations to repeat themselves in
 real life centers on pornography, in print and on film, and on violence
 on television. In ancient Greece, that anxiety centered on performed
 poetry, especially drama. Wherever it surfaces, this concern tends to
 involve two intertwined models of how behavior is transmitted from art
 to life. One is a didactic model based on the assumption that people
 learn behaviors from representations; seeing an imitation gives them an
 idea that they then put into practice. This didactic model is often bound
 up with a less rational and scarier notion of a kind of psychological
 alteration brought about by the experience of spectatorship, expressed
 through metaphors of contagion, contamination, or possession. In fifth
 century Greece, this provocative vision of a psychological takeover
 through art was characteristically embraced and celebrated by the
 sophist Gorgias as he evoked the enchanting power of logos in his
 Encomium of Helen: "I both deem and define all poetry as speech with
 meter. Fearful shuddering and tearful pity and grievous longing come
 upon its hearers, and at the actions and physical sufferings of others in
 good fortunes and in evil fortunes, through the agency of words, the
 soul is wont to experience a suffering of its own."9
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 The ability of represented events to repeat themselves in life becomes
 an issue for tragedy in particular in Aristophanes' comedy Frogs.10 There
 tragedy is judged in terms of its didactic function, its role in molding
 Athenian citizens, and Euripides is faulted for his portrayal of events
 that lead the members of his audiences to behave badly-a defect not
 unrelated to his connections to sophists like Gorgias. In the opening
 rounds of his competition with Aeschylus, Euripides is made to define a
 successful tragic poet as one who makes people better (1009-1010) and
 then is taken to task for portraying women in the grip of illicit passions
 such as Phaedra and Sthenoboea whose stories have, as a consequence,
 been played out in the lives of his contemporaries (1048-1051).
 Aeschylus and Dionysus go on to blame the contents of Euripides' plays
 for the degenerate character of the Athenian population, which is said
 to be disputatious, disrespectful of authority, and out of shape (1069
 1098). While Dionysus' reasons for his final choice of Aeschylus over
 Euripides are hard to pinpoint, it seems clear that the dangerous effects
 of Euripides' subject matter play a major role in his decision.
 A more serious and thoroughgoing account of the subversive effects
 of tragedy-and one that is especially important for Aristotle's Poetics
 is that of Plato in the Republic. Indeed it seems clear that Aristotle's
 defense of tragedy in the Poetics was framed as a response to Plato's
 attack in the tenth book of the Republic, where Socrates envisions himself
 regretfully but firmly dismissing poetry from the ideal city he is in the
 process of constructing.
 While Socrates' ban applies to all forms of poetry other than hymns to
 the gods and praise of good men, and while Plato has several, quite
 complexly related objections to poetry, it gradually becomes clear that
 his greatest quarrel is with tragedy and with tragedy's power to recreate
 in the lives of its audience the undesirable experiences it imitates.
 Plato's assimilation of poetry in general to tragedy is signaled by his
 assertion that poetry characteristically imitates undesirable behavior or,
 as he formulates it, the inferior part of the soul." In the same vein, he
 focuses particularly on lamentation and grief as the experiences imi
 tated in poetry-experiences that naturally accompany the violent and
 disruptive events of tragedy.
 Plato's focus on grief as the subject of poetry allows him to advance a
 particularly subtle and complicated version of the claim that being a
 spectator in a theater can dangerously replicate the undesirable experi
 ence being imitated,'2 because grief is a species of dramatic action that
 is easily assimilated to the largely passive experiences of the spectators
 who watch a play. It becomes easier to argue that the presentation of
 undesirable action in the theater will inspire members of the audietnce
 to perform the same actions themselves and thus will corrupt them if
 that action already resembles the characteristic behavior of spectators.13
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 For Plato, grief is an inappropriate response to suffering because it is
 a continuation of the misfortune that inspires it-a useless perpetuation
 of pain that stands in the way of a cure. A spectator's sympathetic
 response to the suffering of tragic characters is thus a willing abandon
 ment to an undesirable condition, which only perpetuates it further.
 "Even the best of us, when we hear Homer or some one of the other
 tragedians imitating one of the heroes who is suffering and drawing out
 a long speech in his grieving, or chanting and beating his breast, we take
 pleasure and, abandoning ourselves, we follow along, sympathizing and
 encouraging, and we praise as a fine poet the one who especially acts on
 us in this way" (605c0-d5).
 The spectator is here characterized as virtually joining in the action
 (hepometha, "we follow along") and as wanting it to occur (spoudazontes,
 "encouraging"). The result of this participation is that he is more likely
 to replicate in his own life actions he had previously spumed as
 appropriate to a woman: this is the danger that lies behind the pleasure
 of praising and pitying "another man who, claiming to be a good man,
 grieves immoderately," a pleasure that seems innocuous, "on the grounds
 that one is seeing another's sufferings and this carries no shame for
 oneself." "For I think few are capable of reckoning that what someone
 enjoys in the case of others must have effects for himself: as he cultivates
 pity where they are concerned it becomes difficult to check it in the case
 of his own misfortunes" (606bl-8). Here, paradoxically, the spectator's
 awareness that what he is seeing is not actually happening to him only
 makes it more likely that in the future it will.
 Plato's condemnation of poetry sets the terms for Aristotle's defense
 of it, and the argument of the Poetics is marked by several different
 responses to the claim that viewing an imitation is tantamount to
 experiencing what is imitated. One of these responses is rebuttal, and
 both Aristotle's account of mimesis and his identification of catharsis as
 the proper effect of tragedy involve the counterclaim that seeing an
 imitation of something is very different from seeing the thing itself.
 Early in the Poetics, Aristotle champions mimesis, claiming that all
 people have an innate love of imitation that stems from the capacity of
 imitations to convey general truths (denied to mimesis by Plato) that is
 grounded in imitations' distinction from the objects they imitate; as a
 result of this distinction, viewers of imitations do not surrender them
 selves to the experience represented but have an entirely different
 experience, one of learning.
 There are things that we see in their actual state with distress, yet we take
 pleasure in viewing the most accurate representations of them, for example the
 forms of the most detested animals and corpses. The reason for this is that
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 learning is not only the greatest pleasure for philosophers but equally for others,
 although they participate in it in a more limited way. They take pleasure in
 seeing representations because it happens that as they view them they learn and
 draw conclusions about each thing, for example that this thing is that sort of
 thing. (P4.1448bll-17)
 The claim that the emotional response evoked by a mimesis of
 something dreadful is a beneficial experience different from the re
 sponse one would have to the thing itself reappears in explicit connec
 tion with tragedy in the notion of catharsis as the effect achieved by a
 tragic performance. Catharsis is a key element in Aristotle's understand
 ing of tragedy, as is clear from its position in the definition of tragedy he
 gives in chapter 6, where tragedy is characterized as "through pity and
 fear accomplishing a catharsis of such pathematon." But one of the chief
 puzzles of the Poetics is the discrepancy between the obvious centrality of
 catharsis to Aristotle's thinking and the absence of any explanation of
 what it is. What clarification is to be found comes from a passage in the
 discussion of musical education in the Politics"4 which is, by Aristotle's
 own admission, a sketchy account. An exact understanding of what
 Aristotle means by catharsis may elude us,'5 but, even without one, we can
 recognize that he has in mind an effect that is beneficial, transformative,
 and discontinuous with what causes it. The element of catharsis in the
 experience of viewing a representation means that that experience
 changes the emotional disposition of the spectator for the better, as
 really experiencing what is represented could not.
 In the Politics passage, Aristotle specifies that catharsis brings about a
 change for the better in people who are subject to strong emotion. For
 those who are possessed by enthousiasmos, religious ecstasy, the experi
 ence of orgiastic music can leave them "restored as if having found
 healing and catharsis" (8.7, 1342all-12). And to the extent that every
 one is susceptible to emotions-notably, he specifies pity and fear-"it
 happens to all that there is some catharsis and they are lightened
 through pleasure" (8.7, 1342al4-15). Catharsis is like a medical interven
 tion in the course of a disease, or like the removal of a weight from
 someone who is burdened; it alters the course of an emotional response
 so that it is no longer continuous with what produced it. In this way
 catharsis is crucial to Aristotle's answer to Plato, allowing him to deny the
 damaging equation between the experiences of dramatic characters and
 their onlookers that figures in Plato's condemnation. "Cathartic compo
 sitions" offer "pleasure without harmful consequences" (8.7, 1342al5
 16). Like mimesis, catharsis produces a tour deforce, removing emotion by
 evoking it.
 These two related notions-the idea that a mimesis affects its audience
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 differently than would the object imitated and the idea that catharsis is
 the effect created by tragedy-allow Aristotle to present as desirable and
 admirable an art form filled with unnatural deaths and other acts of
 violence. They allow him to defend a genre in which people regularly
 kill their own relatives, and in which-as in what is described in chapter
 13 as the best kind of tragic plot-a person who is not morally bad is
 nonetheless plunged into misfortune through the commission of a
 terrible crime. It is one of the great achievements of the Poetics that
 Aristotle is able to find a solution to objections so compelling and
 enduring as Plato's, arguing successfully against powerful and persistent
 fears about the dangers of imitation. At the same time, Aristotle himself
 also registers those fears. At points in the text he can be observed
 acknowledging and making accommodations to the very objections to
 imitative poetry that his own arguments dismiss, making room in his
 theory for concerns he would seem to have banished from it.
 Much of Aristotle's vocabulary for poetry's effect on its listeners
 betrays a sense that works of art transmit the experiences they portray to
 their audiences. In chapter 6, he evokes the effect of tragedy with the
 verb psuchagogeo and its cognate adjective psuchagogikon, a verb which
 means to impose a movement on a soul, as in ghost-raising, or more
 metaphorically in persuasion, and which suggests a concept of art's
 effect close to that of Gorgias.'6 To describe the undesirable effect on an
 audience of the kind of plot that should be avoided (the downfall of an
 unexceptionably good man [P 13.1452b36] or the knowing murder of a
 relative [P 14.1453b39; cf. 14.1454a3]), Aristotle uses the word miaron,
 which is usually translated here weakly as "morally repugnant," but really
 means "polluted" and thus "dangerous" and "contarninating."'7
 Aristotle further registers a sense of continuity between an action
 imitated and the act of observing it through his efforts to circumscribe
 and moderate the dreadful actions imitated by tragedy. He makes those
 actions resemble the experience he has shown to be beneficial, the
 experience of being a spectator. This point brings us back to the issue
 with which I started, the significance of the second version of the best
 tragic plot introduced in chapter 14. For that plot, in which "someone
 about to do something irremediable undergoes recognition before
 doing it," incorporates within itself the changed course, the paradox of
 painful events that bring pleasure and profit, and the gap between
 seeing and doing that, for Aristotle, make watching a dramatic perform
 ance a beneficial experience.
 In the ideal plot of chapter 14, anagnorisis, or recognition of identity,
 becomes the central event of the drama. In the history of criticism,
 Aristotle's stress on anagn6risis has generally been invoked to support a
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 vision of literary plots as centering on moments of insight, occasions
 when characters are forced to confront suppressed or unwanted truths
 about themselves or the world.'8 But that vision does not correspond to
 Aristotle's reasons for making anagnorisis so central to his most favored
 plot. What really interests Aristotle about anagnorisis is the way that
 recognition can forestall pathos, the way it can prevent an act of violence
 from taking place, and the way it supplants that act of violence as the
 main event of the play. This function is clear from Aristotle's summary of
 the plot of Euripides' Merope as an example of the best kind: "Merope is
 about to kill her son, but doesn't kill him and recognizes him instead"
 (P 1454a5-7).
 A plot of this kind places at its center, not an act of family violence, but
 the realization that such an act was about to take place. The experience
 dramatized is not a certain action, but the perception that such an
 action might have occurred. As a consequence, the characters in the
 play become similar to spectators, who by seeing a play become aware of
 dreadful experiences, who learn that such things can happen, but do
 not actually undergo those experiences.'9 In such plots, tragic events
 come close enough to happening that, like the depictions of repellent
 animals cited in chapter 4, the play instructs its audience about what can
 happen. But by keeping those events prospective rather than actual,
 such a plot protects it audience from exposure to characters who act
 transgressively or suffer unjustly.20
 If a character in a play is brought up short by a recognition scene and
 desists from an act of violence, he or she does not present the audience
 with a bad example of someone acting and suffering as they themselves
 should wish never to act or suffer, but rather with an image of their own
 instructive experience as spectators. The intervention of a recognition
 scene creates a gap between evocation and fulfillment that protects a
 play's characters from contamination by actual violence and suffering as
 the comparable gap caused by the play's status as mimesis protects the
 audience from that same contamination. Both characters and audience
 become aware of the possibility of horrific, polluting actions, but do not
 actually experience them.
 Aristotle also heightens the similarity between tragic characters and
 spectators by stressing cognition as an element of the audience's
 experience much as he stresses recognition as an element of the tragic
 plot. In general, Aristotle's conception of what happens to an audience
 has a much greater cognitive or intellectual dimension than Plato's.21 As
 noted above, his defense of mimesis centers on the claim that seeing an
 imitation is an educational experience. Specifically in connection with
 tragedy, Aristotle stresses the intelligibility of the successful tragic plot,
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 the way it places events within a comprehensible causal pattern so that
 even if they occur unexpectedly (para ten doxan), they occur because of
 one another (di' allela) (P9.1452a4).
 Aristotle further assimilates characters and spectators by emphasizing
 recognition as an aspect of spectatorship. In chapter 4 the learning
 derived from viewing an imitation is a form of recognition: "They take
 pleasure in seeing representations because it happens that as they view
 them they learn and draw conclusions about each thing, for example
 that this thing is that sort of thing" (P 4.1448bll-17, cf. Rhet. 1.11,
 1371b8-10). In connection with tragedy, he defines the experience of
 fear, one of the two emotions with which audiences respond to tragedy,
 as involving a kind of recognition of kinship: in chapter 13, he specifies
 that fear is an emotion aroused by the misfortunes of someone homoios,
 "similar," presumably someone in whose place a spectator can imagine
 being.22
 The function of at once evoking and withholding tragic events that is
 built into Aristotle's favored plot of averted violence is also a key feature,
 although in a less concrete form, of his second best plot, the kind
 represented by the Oedipus Tyrannus, in which "people unknowingly
 perform a dreadful act, then afterwards recognize the relationship"
 (P 14.1453b30-31). This is, of course, the ideal plot of chapter 13, now
 identified as including an episode of recognition. In such plots, tragic
 events do occur, but under carefully contrived circumstances in which
 the relationship between the participants that makes those events tragic
 is effectively removed, cancelled by the characters' ignorance of another's
 identities. When the action occurs, it is merely an encounter of
 strangers; it only takes on its proper horror later, when the family
 relationship is brought to light.
 The functioning of such a plot points up how thoroughly the appeal
 of anagnorisis for Aristotle is tied up with its precondition, hamartia, a
 lapse of some sort that in this context particularly connotes ignorance of
 identity.23 Hamartia is only referred to twice in the Poetics, but it performs
 the key function of explaining how characters who are not morally bad
 can come to be involved in transgressive and polluting acts. Thus it is
 invoked in chapter 13 to define the proper relations between the moral
 condition of the protagonist and the misfortune that befalls him:
 "someone who is not outstanding in virtue andjustice, but who does not
 fall into misfortune through maliciousness and villainy, but rather
 through some hamartia" (P 13.1453a8-10). Hamartia makes tragedy
 acceptable by exonerating the characters tragedy imitates, protecting
 tragic characters, and by extension the spectators who identify with
 them, from the evil that attaches to their actions.
 Even if anagnorisis does not occur in time to forestall an act of pathos,
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 as in the best type of plot, the hamartia that precedes anagnoinisis drains
 that act of significance and transfers its horror-its capacity to evoke pity
 and fear-to the discrete, subsequent act of recognition. In either case,
 the central event of tragedy becomes an experience of cognition rather
 than a transgressive act, as transgressive action is displaced into the
 realm of the notional, existing only in prospect of retrospect. The
 shedding of kindred blood becomes something that almost happens or,
 as in the case of Oedipus, something that happens without anyone
 knowing it; the revelation of that near catastrophe, or of that unrecog
 nized crime, can be sufficiently shocking and terrifying to convey the
 horror of the action-in a successful tragedy it must be-but it nonethe
 less occurs at a significant, mitigating distance from the actual per
 for-mance of the deed. While the favored plot of chapter 13 has been
 demoted when it reappears in second place in chapter 14, it has also
 been refined through its association with hamartia and anagnorisis so that
 it hardly differs in this salient characteristic from the plot of averted
 misfortune that deposes it from first place.
 The way these two kinds of recognition plot achieve the same goal of
 banishing violence between philoi, but at different levels of abstraction
 one by literally excluding it from the plot and the other by excluding it
 from the moral implications of what does occur-reflects a close
 connection between what are presented as technical issues of plot
 construction and moral issues. The recognition scene, which Aristotle
 treats as a means of achieving effects of surprise, actually restricts the
 moral universe of tragedy: as Aristotle conceives of it, tragedy becomes a
 demonstration that people only want to kill their relatives when they do
 not know who they are.
 Aristotle wants tragedy to be so constructed as to deny a central tragic
 insight: that people can want to harm those they are expected to love
 most, or even those whom they do love most.24 He does not altogether
 rule out plots in which people knowingly harm their philoi but he does
 marginalize them through his favored activity of ranking. In the hierar
 chy of types established in chapter 14, he ranks such plots no higher
 than third, citing the episode in which Medea in Euripides' Medea kills
 her own children. He further relegates such plots to the periphery of his
 theory by attributing them to hoi palaioi, "earlier playwrights," assigning
 them to a period when, according to his teleological vision, tragedy had
 not yet fully acquired its definitive form.
 Predictably, Aristotle ranks lowest of all those plots in which charac
 ters knowingly intend to harm their philoi, but then do not carry out
 their intention-again citing a powerful episode from extant tragedy,
 Haemon's failed attempt to kill his father in Sophocles' Antigone. In
 explaining this view, he reverts to the position and terminology of
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 chapter 13, labeling such a plot ou tragikon, "not tragic," because apathes,
 "without pathos" (P 14.1453b29).25 When the action in prospect is so
 alien to his moral vision, he rediscovers the importance of actual pathos
 and retreats from the claim implied in his choice of best plot that a
 prospective action can be as powerful as an actual one. In contradicting
 himself here, Aristotle betrays an ongoing awareness of the heightened
 impact of an event that is actually presented and not just evoked, an
 awareness that recurrently conflicts with his desire to expel actual
 performance from drama.
 The most glaring contradiction of the Poetics-the contradiction
 between the best plot of chapter 13 and the best plot of chapter 14, with
 which this discussion began-turns out to be only the clearest manifes
 tation of a contradiction that is basic to the thought of the Poetics and
 that is actually found within both of those plots: a contradiction between
 tragedy's need to present forcefully and convincingly extreme and
 horrifying acts and its need to keep those acts at a distance, denying in
 one way or another that they are really taking place. Defending tragedy,
 Aristotle adopts two contradictory strategies that are allied as responses
 to these conflicting demands. He endorses tragedy's evocation of
 horrific events under the controlled, distanced conditions of imitation,
 and he delimits the contents of tragedy so that it itself carries out the
 work of containing, controlling, and distancing its own contents.
 The contradictory impulses that shape the Poetics can be found at
 every level of expression. Many of Aristotle's most suggestive formula
 tions are inherently paradoxical. Events are most capable of arousing
 pity and fear when they happen para ten doxan di' allela, "unexpectedly
 because of one another" (P 9.1452a4), an expression that unites the
 shock of the abnormal with the reassuring realization that the abnormal
 is in accord with logic. Similarly, poetry is defined as presenting pithanon
 adunator, "credible impossibility" (P25.1461bI 1), which simultaneously
 affirms and denies the truth of poetic imitations.
 Often Aristotle's own thought follows the pattern of the tragic plot,
 raising a possibility only to put it at a distance, whether at the level of the
 phrase or of the larger argument. For example, when hamartia is first
 mentioned, it emerges to counter evocations of evil and baseness that
 have just been called forth through litotes, "not through maliciousness
 and villainy ... but through some error" (P 13.1453a8-10). The initial
 definition of pathos similarly begins by listing distinct instances of painful
 experience and then trails off into a comforting vagueness: "such as
 deaths out in the open, and physical sufferings, and woundings and
 everything else of that kind" (P 11.1452bl2-13).6
 Within the larger structure of the treatise, the treatment of pathos
 follows a similar pattern: once it has been mentioned in chapter 12,
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 along with anagnorisis and peripeteia, as one of the three parts of the
 tragic plot, pathos remains oddly out of view for the rest of the discussion,
 while anagnorisis and peripeteia are thoroughly elaborated.27 Thus Aristotle
 gives pathos the same treatment in his text that, in his view, it ought to
 receive in tragedy. And, finally, this recurrent structure is also rehearsed
 in the progression from chapter 13, where Aristotle conjures up a
 dreadful misfortune, to chapter 14, where he reformulates it out of
 existence with the help of hamartia and anagnorisis. The change in
 course represented by the progression from chapter 13 to chapter 14 of
 the Poetics implicitly recapitulates the changed course that is intrinsic
 both to an audience's experience of cathartic poetry and to the shape of
 the ideal tragic plot. Thus Aristotle reenacts in his theory the plot he
 prefers for tragedy.28
 This tendency on Aristotle's part to turn his theory into a version of
 tragedy is only one manifestation of his constant project in the Poetics of
 replacing tragic actions with ideas that reflect them. As we have seen,
 this project is manifested in Aristotle's preference for a plot that
 substitutes knowledge of a near catastrophe for the catastrophe itself,
 and in his championing of a concept of mimesis that stresses the
 difference between the imitation and the act imitated. It is also regis
 tered in Aristotle's attempt to dispense with the actual performance of a
 play. He downplays opsis or "spectacle" as an element in tragedy,
 claiming that the same effect can be gotten from reading a text of the
 play or even by hearing a summary of its plot (P 14.1453b3-7, cf.
 6.1450b16-20; 26.1462all-13, 17-18). And finally, the composition of
 the Poetics itself fulfills this goal. As an account of tragedy, the text
 substitutes an idealized, sanitized description of what tragedy should be
 for actual plays. In effect, the Poetics proposes a widening series of
 ameliorating substitutions: the substitution of imminent events for
 actual events; the substitution of an imitation of those imminent events
 for an experience of them; the substitution of reading or hearing about
 that imitation for a performance of it; and finally the substitution of a
 theoretical discussion for the plays themselves.
 The surface composure of the Poetics is undoubtedly disturbed by
 Aristotle's conflicting impulses to defend tragedy's presentation of
 horrific events and to devise strategies by which those events are alluded
 to but never quite performed. But if the text is therefore pervaded by
 contradiction, that does not disqualify it as a description of actual
 tragedy. The contradictions of the Poetics are conditioned by the nature
 of tragedy itself, which has the paradoxical mission of giving acceptable
 form to unacceptable actions, of presenting the unpresentable. As
 tragedy's apologist, Aristotle unsurprisingly vacillates between stressing
 tragedy's power to shock and terrify-to evoke what seems unrelievedly
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 hornific-and stressing tragedy's capacity to remedy, or undo, or dis
 tance that horror. His consequently unstable theory corresponds to the
 precarious and volatile model that tragedy itself must follow if it is to
 succeed and to be accepted within civilization.
 Tragedy must represent forcefully and persuasively the most painful
 and transgressive things that human beings can do or suffer, and yet it
 must not present them so forcefully that they seem incapable of being
 contained. In fulfilling this mandate, tragedy always runs a double risk,
 on the one hand of trivializing and denaturing tragic events, on the
 other of making them seem so compelling-of making the momentum
 toward them seem so unstoppable-as to raise the fear that what is
 presented in the theater will spill over and contaminate the audience,
 causing those events to proliferate in real life. When it avoids both risks,
 tragedy can claim a double achievement of at once making visible and
 yet not really presenting the events it portrays. In this way it represents a
 tour deforce that crystallizes an essential feature of mimesis itself.
 The close connection that really does exist between Aristotle's con
 ception of tragedy and actual tragic practice can best be appreciated by
 focusing, as in the preceding argument, on the unstated affinity between
 the tragic plot as Aristotle conceives of it and tragic form. Aristotle's
 account of the contents of tragedy undoubtedly omits much of what is
 most powerful and unsettling in the actual plays: divine forces working
 unpredictably on human life, outbreaks of the irrational, characters so
 filled with murderous rage toward their philoi that they are not at all
 deterred from violence by knowing who their victims are. But the corpus
 of Greek tragedy contains many plays that do have happy endings and
 that do act out a substitution of recognition for pathos or some
 comparable displacement. And, at the level of form, tragedy does answer
 to Aristotle's conception of mimesis as mediated representation rather
 than direct enactment.
 Tragedy is notable for the indirectness with which it presents the main
 events of the myths it dramatizes. The most harrowing events of tragic
 plots--deaths, acts of violence, and other disasters-typically occur
 offstage and are presented in some mediated form, often through a
 messenger's speech. Tragedy communicates to its audience through a
 complex mixture of seen and unseen experiences,29 and offers in this
 way a series of implicit commentaries on civilization's attempts to
 acknowledge and yet distance those actions and accidents that it places
 outside its bounds.3"
 The characteristic indirectness of Greek tragedy is usually understood
 in technical terms, as a way of dealing with the difficulty of presenting
 such events directly in a classical theater-an open-air space that lacked
 such equipment as lights, curtains, and trap doors.31 But locating a
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 technical source for this phenomenon should not mean denying its
 close link to tragedy's thematic concerns and social function.32 As this
 discussion has shown, the technical conditions of theatrical presentation
 are by no means incidental to the nature of tragedy.
 The extant examples of Greek tragedy manifest the same combina
 tion of evocation and distancing of pathos that Aristotle implicitly seeks
 in describing and defending tragedy as a genre. However this phenom
 enon was thought of by classical playwrights and their audiences, it
 remained an indispensable constituent of the form. Indirectness of
 presentation may be an especially marked feature of our earliest
 examples, such as Aeschylus's Persians, which concerns itself with the
 virtually unstageable subject of a naval battle; but it persisted as tragedy
 became a more naturalistic form.
 The persistence of indirection and its link to other than solely
 technical considerations is well illustrated by the two versions of Euripides'
 Hippolytus. The first version presented a transgressive situation-not
 violence between relatives, but its inverse, erotic desire between rela
 tives-directly. Phaedra met her stepson Hippolytus on stage and
 declared her desire to him directly. Clearly this episode was technically
 presentable, but it proved unacceptable to its audience. Euripides felt
 compelled to contrive a new version, the version we now have, in which
 Phaedra's desire is communicated to Hippolytus indirectly, by her nurse
 acting as her intermediary, in a scene that takes place offstage.33
 A further sign of the deep affinity between Aristotle's model and
 actual tragedy can be found in the unexpected resemblance of that
 model to a feature of tragedy that Aiistotle wholly overlooks, its
 relationship to ritual. Aristotle's rationalized, secular, quasi legal vision
 of tragedy leaves no room for the ritual dimension that contemporary
 scholars are increasingly identifying as a major element of the genre.
 Aristotle pays no attention to the ritual setting of tragic performance,
 underplays the role of the gods in tragic plots, and gives an account of
 the origin of tragedy that is resolutely literary. And yet the plot he sees as
 the soul of tragedy (P 6.1450a37) functions much as does ritual,
 especially the kind of ritual that, like tragedy, is designed to address
 human involvement in violence and unnatural death, namely sacrifice.34
 Like imitation in Aristotle's view, sacrifice is a practice that defines
 what it is to be human. Like a tragic mimesis, a sacrifice is an enactment
 of human violence toward other human beings that does not really take
 place, in this case because the violence is displaced onto an animal
 rather than a human victim. Here too the occasion is controlled by'a
 principle of substitution according to which a simulation of an event is
 put in the place of its actual occurrence. Most of those for whose benefit
 the ritual takes place participate vicariously, as spectators rather than as
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 direct participants. Those who do participate directly are protected from
 responsibility for a brutal action by a scenario through which the
 sacrificial animal is made to act transgressively and thus to earn its
 violent death, and by gestures suggesting the animal's ultimate regenera
 tion, which Karl Meuli suggestively labeled a "comedy of innocence"
 (Unschuldskomidie). These devices for indemnifying the participants in
 a sacrifice are strongly reminiscent of the contrivances of Aristotle's
 tragic plots: hamartia, which assures the innocence of the character who
 performs a violent act, and anagnorisis, which rescues the victim from
 the fate for which he or she appears destined-both of which seem to
 belong more properly to comedy.3"
 One of the most salient differences between ritual and tragedy is that
 the scripts of plays are not preordained as are the procedures of rituals.
 The contents of tragedy are fluid and can always threaten the equilib
 rium of the genre by seeming insufficiently distanced, contained, or
 ritualized, as happened with the first version of the Hippolytus and other
 plays of Euripides (including some, like the Bacchae, that presented
 human beings as sacrificial victims). Aristotle's ambivalence about
 whether it is desirable for tragic drama actually to present tragic action
 points us to the ongoing dilemma that a tragic playwright confronted
 each time he constructed a new tragic plot, and shows how central to a
 play's meaning is the negotiation it carries out between allowing us to
 see what terrible things can happen and shielding us from being
 exposed to them directly.
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